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Introduction
Despite the growing scientific, political, and public recognition of global climate
change (Ury 2011; IPCC Summary 2013), an increasingly partisan debate in US
politics threatens to undermine the movement’s momentum evident a decade ago.
Public opinion, while generally recognizing the reality of climate change, remains
ambivalent on its causes and public policy implications (Dunlap and McCright
2008; Guber 2012; Zajko 2011). The lack of a galvanized public undoubtedly
emboldens many national leaders to sidestep consideration of climate change. The
recent US disengagement from the Paris Climate Agreement and the response of
states, cities, and other actors to this decision (Popovich and Schlossberg 2017) is
one more twist in what Rabe (2008: 105) refers to as the “odyssey of climate change
policy.”
Notwithstanding this apparent pause in the climate change movement,
subnational governments play a significant role in addressing climate change at the
local level (Betsill 2001). Cities can address local sources of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions and simultaneously affect the tenor of public debate and policy.
According to Bulkeley (2010), cities have a significant carbon footprint, perhaps as
much as 75 percent of global GHG emissions, although estimates vary. Lee and
Koski (2012) add that cities control a number of factors of modern life that
contribute directly to the problem of GHG emissions, including land use, municipal
waste, and building codes. At the same time, municipalities are limited in their
capacity to “own” and manage sources of GHG emissions for which they have little
control, particularly in the absence of state and federal policy.
Cities must also overcome the “rationality” of climate inaction; cities can neither
limit the benefits of climate mitigation to their own boundaries nor insulate
themselves from the effects of GHG emissions outside those boundaries (Krause
2011). As Engle and Orbach (2008: 120) note: "In such instances, free riding is
often the economically superior course of action." Individual cities contribute
relatively little to the overall problem of climate change, thus motivating action at
this level runs counter to individual rationality in a global commons (Zahran 2010).
Encouraging cities to address climate change in the face of limited expectation of
success represents an interesting collective action problem.
The evolution of several “city networks” at both the national and global level
indicates that these collective behavior problems are not insurmountable. In the
United States, the largest city network by far is the United States Conference of

Mayors (USCM) Mayor’s Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA). The MCPA
evolved in 2005 from the effort of a few mayors. Signatories of the MCPA
committed their cities to reducing GHG emissions to 7 percent below their 1990
levels by 2012, the same goal as the Kyoto Treaty when it became effective in 2006.
Almost 1000 cities had signed the agreement by 2009 (USCM 2009), representing
the majority of mayors in the conference, 5 percent of cities, and 30 percent of the
US population (Krause 2010). While the shelf life of the agreement did not extend
past 2012, the USCM has nonetheless continued to promote a variety of climate
protection policies, research, and official recognition of exemplary city practices.1
States have also taken on a significant role in promoting energy and climate
policy despite the absence of federal policy leadership (Barbour and Deakin 2012;
Zahran et al. 2010; Vasseur 2014). The majority of states are addressing energy
issues with the goal of reducing energy use and promoting alternative sources of
power (see Carley 2011 for a review). Currently, 34 states have a state Climate
Action Plan (CAP) (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2017). Kwon et al.
(2014) argue that states can play an entrepreneurial role promoting climate
activism. Most state CAPs were enacted in the first decade of this century,
reflecting greater bi-partisan agreement regarding the need to address climate
change. Since then, climate debates have become increasingly fractious; although
most states continued to promote a wide portfolio of energy policies (Carley 2011),
a few states have backpedaled on such commitments (Deitchman 2017: 50).
Thus, while cities and states are central to the climate debate, the degree to
which state-level factors influence municipal climate activism remains uncertain.
Krause (2010: 48) argues it is logical to expect that a certain degree of “vertical
diffusion” exists between states and cities regarding climate policy. Policy
diffusion from cities and states to the federal government has characterized a
number of public policies, including state-mandated recycling. Selin and
VanDeveer (2007) add that policy diffusion exists across municipal networks, as
well as other organized coalitions promoting policy innovation and learning among
sub-state actors, including state regional climate initiatives, public-private
partnerships, and private sector groups. Thus, we would expect that states leading
in climate planning will also have a greater number of cities and a larger percentage
of the population associated with MCPA. However, several factors are also likely
to influence state-level municipal activism, including civic capacity and coastal
proximity (Brody et al. 2009), partisanship (Deitchman 2017; Geri and McNabb
2011), climate stress (Zahran et al. 2008), and state energy leadership (Selin and

VanDeveer 2007). This research examines whether state sociodemographic factors
and energy policy are associated with two measures of municipal climate activism
treated as a state-level phenomenon.
Climate Protection and City Networks
Several major “city networks” (Lee and van de Meene 2012: 200) have evolved to
address climate change. The municipal climate protection movement, however, is
of relatively recent origin, corresponding to the growth of global climate change as
an environmental problem. One of the first networks to evolve was the International
Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) Cities for Climate Protection
(CCP). This network has grown to over 1000 cities throughout the world (Bulkeley
2010). Betsill (2001) notes that the CCP project formed in 1990, establishing the
Urban CO2 Reduction Project or UCRP in the US, Canada, and Europe the
following year. In 1993, this campaign morphed into the CCP campaign. The CCP
campaign requires cities to issue an executive decree binding the city to the CCP
campaign goal. By 2001, 79 US cities were part of the CCP. As Zahran et al. (2008)
note, the campaign moves cities from emission analysis to action plans with specific
timetables for targeting CO2 emissions to 20 percent below 1990 levels, which is
significantly more proactive than the Kyoto Treaty. Bulkeley (2010) indicates that
a second wave of networks formed in the 2000s. These newer networks are more
likely to have evolved within national contexts, the US Conference of Mayors being
one of the first to do so in 2005.2
Much of the research on climate city networks examines differences between
signatory and nonsignatory cities as well as the "rationality" of joining a city
network. For example, Zahran et al. (2008) examine the ecological factors for why
cities participate in climate change activities despite the free rider problem,
focusing on climate risk, such as proximity to the east or west coast, local climate
stressors, and civic capacity to adapt locally. Such commitments are more likely
when regional planning and coordinating entities reduce the cost of participation to
localities and increase the selective incentives for doing so. Overcoming such costs
has often entailed framing climate actions in terms of the additional “co-benefits”
that are realized (Kwon et al. 2014), such as economic growth or future fiscal
payoffs. Betsill (2001) also emphasizes the importance of “local hooks” when
framing climate protection, to “think locally, act locally” (p. 404), particularly as
this relates to such local issues as air quality, quality of life, and development.
Furthermore, while cities have “localized the policy of controlling GHG emissions”

(p. 398), many cities nonetheless frame the issue as a global problem. Where cities
do not traditionally prioritize environmental protection, such hooks may not be
available to address climate mitigation or adaptation. Brody et al. (2009) underscore
the significance of local excludable benefits, but also the importance of climate
risks or anthropogenic climate stressors, and local capacity to address GHG
emissions for predicting municipal climate action.
The question raised by this research and others is why some cities engage in
climate activism, or conversely, why some do not. As Hamin et al. (2014) note,
local governments that lack access to peer cities, regional networks, or progressive
state policies are likely to face greater obstacles in implementing such plans at the
local level. Research on coastal communities in Massachusetts experiencing sea
level increases suggests that these “capacity constraints” (p. 113) make planning
challenging even when climate change is evident. As Wood et al. (2014) argue,
local leaders face a variety of community attitudes regarding climate change from
active support to apathy and hostility. Where municipal leaders cannot count on a
supportive community environment, signing the MCPA, or more recent USCM
pledges, could be politically problematic. Their research points out that while “viral
governance” has encouraged states and municipalities to engage in climate
planning, the reality on the ground is much more complex. Many communities are
reframing climate problems as “something else” (p. 548) and thus bypassing
potentially adverse community reactions.
An important issue to address, particularly if cities become the primary agents
of climate policy, is whether municipal climate actions have a significant impact in
reducing GHG emissions. Wang (2012) asserts that there is a tendency for cities to
focus on “win-win” measures that emphasize the co-benefits of climate action,
particularly those related to mitigation rather than adaptation. This may be
particularly true for the MCPA compared to the ICLEI-CCP network, which is
more predictive of those climate actions not typically taken by cities to mitigate
GHG emissions. On the other hand, Wood et al (2014) and Krause (2011) found
significantly higher mean number of mitigation actions for MCPA signatory cities
compared to their nonsignatory counterparts. Similarly, Lee and Koski (2012)
found that MCPA cities had a higher number of green building projects, specifically
those that are Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEEDS) certified.
However, as Wang (2012) notes, the MCPA’s lack of enforcement mechanisms or
consequences for not meeting emission goals makes it difficult to distinguish
symbolic or politically expedient statements from more substantial commitments.

In summary, many US cities are engaged in climate activism despite having to
overcome significant disincentives for doing so. Factors identified with increasing
municipal climate activism of particular note are local climate risks, civic capacity,
local organizational capacity, political partisanship, commitment to a climate
agreement, and membership in a peer network promoting climate activism. Mayors
facing uncertain local political support may nonetheless address climate change if
state energy plans and political climate provide a rationale for action. The following
section outlines the evolution of states’ response to climate change.
The Role of States in Promoting Climate Action
Geri and McNabb (2011) note that at least since the budget cuts of the 1980s under
the Reagan Administration, energy policy has increasingly become the province of
states. As with other matters left to the states, policy innovation has led to “. . .
either a profusion of experimentation, or a hodgepodge of inconsistent and
conflicting standards, depending on one’s perspective” (2011: 101). Despite this,
as Carley (2011: 291) notes, states are pursuing a wide variety of energy policy
goals focusing on three broad outcomes—diversification, decentralization, and
decarbonization. Fischlein et al. (2014) suggest that energy policy is largely the
purview of states, both in terms of setting broad policy objectives, the
implementation of these policies, and the regulation of public utilities. Given the
relative absence of federal climate policy specifically targeting carbon emissions,
states have become “laboratories for climate change policy” (p. 171). State Energy
Offices exist in every state but play very different roles, some acting with relative
autonomy and others whose function is subsumed under other departments
(Deitchman 2017: 8-10). While some states are clearly early adopters of climate
policy (Posner 2010: 78) and leading by example, such as California (see Kwon et
al. 2012; Barbour and Deakin 2012), other states are back pedaling regarding
energy efficiency and renewable energy standards (Deitchman 2017: 50; Center for
Climate and Energy Solutions 2017). Despite such variance in approach, states are
making significant headway in reducing GHG emissions (Drummon 2010),
promoting renewable energy (Vasseur 2014; Carley 2012), financing energy
projects (Deitchman 2017), and other outcomes that promote energy development
(Carley 2016). As Geri and McNabb (2011: 79) note though, the availability of
encompassing federal subsidies enabled states to make such broad energy and
climate commitments, particularly during the economic recovery.

Rabe (2004; 2008; 2011) argues that states are the primary locus of climate
change governance, but not only because of federal reticence to engage consistently
across presidential administrations. States have come to define the issue in terms of
their own political and/or economic self-interests, addressing a variety of energy
issues, including energy development and efficiency, responding to climate related
events, positioning themselves as climate leaders, and managing municipal waste.
Much of the groundwork for climate change policy developed in the 1990s prior to
the Kyoto debate. By the late 1990s, partisan pushback was occurring not only in
Washington, D.C., but also in state houses, some of whom rallied against treaty
ratification as well as climate action in the absence of federal leadership. While
some states inhibited efforts to address climate change, all states nonetheless
continued to promote energy policies of one kind or another, albeit with differing
motivations. The framing of energy issues, including climate change, differs from
state to state, sometimes explicitly addressing the reduction of GHG emissions or
through such “stealth” policies as energy efficiency, vehicle use reduction, and
renewable energy portfolio standards (RPS). The rise of the MCPA occurred
between 2005-2007, during what Rabe (2011) refers to as the period “state
domination” of climate policy (1997-2007). The election of President Obama and
the Supreme Court ruling in Massachusetts vs. EPA in 2007 providing the EPA the
statutory authority to regulate carbon dioxide as an air pollutant began a new period
of “contested federalism,” involving renewed efforts by the federal government to
define the climate agenda.
Geri and McNabb (2011: 104) argue that energy policy in the first decade of this
century was a comparatively bi-partisan endeavor. Debates around climate change
policy, at least at the Federal level, have since taken on the more partisan character
associated with environmental policy. As Rabe (2011) notes above, some of this
partisanship has migrated to the states. The MCPA emerged at a time where there
was national recognition of the significance of climate change, the value of
increasing energy efficiency and renewable energy, and decreasing reliance on
foreign sources of power. As Deitchman (2017: 65) asserts, state-level climate
policy innovation occurred when the majority of state houses were under
Democratic control. The changing tide of political control of state governments to
the Republican Party may be consequential for the continued retreat from the
carbon economy. Deitchman asserts that the “. . . generalization and conventional
wisdom that Democrats support more stringent action on greenhouse gas emissions
mitigation than their Republican Party counterparts is accurate and verifiable”

(2017: 49-50). However, many states pursue energy policies that are beneficial to
GHG reductions, such as renewable energy and stricter building codes, without
specific reference to climate change (Selin and VanDeveer 2007; Wood et al.
2014).
States thus play a central role in defining the energy and climate policy agenda
by promoting a wide portfolio of policy instruments but with significant variation
across states (Fischlein et al. 2014). It is logical to expect that states with
demonstrated leadership in promoting the reduction of GHG emissions would also
have a higher prevalence of municipal climate activism. We examine the impact of
state-level energy and climate policy, as well as other factors identified in the
literature (Krause 2010; Zahran et al. 2008; Wang 2012; Brody et al. 2009; Kwon
et al. 2014), on municipal climate activism, but focus solely on US states as the unit
of analysis.
Methodology
A large degree of variation in policy, economic and industrial activity, culture, and
other factors characterizes the US political system. Thus, while individual US states
exist within one singular society, there is incredible diversity within states, making
a state-based comparison highly appealing. Many comparable studies have assessed
phenomena—including policy and environmental conditions—via a state level
analysis (Clement & Schultz 2011, Dietz et al. 2015, Tung et al. 2014, Valdmanis
2015, Vasseur 2014). As with previous research, the current study utilizes data
gathered from a variety of sources, all measured at the state level for a few
methodological reasons. First, there is no consistent municipal-level data for
environmental organizations, political representation or ideology, and other social
factors for making appropriate comparisons. Second, many of the signatory
municipalities exist within larger Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) thus
complicating the analysis. Aggregating data at the state level simplifies these
problems. Data sources reflect either specific years or a range of years
corresponding to the efforts of the USCM MCPA campaign.
Our analysis uses two dependent variables: (1) the percentage of a state’s
residents who reside in cities covered by the MCPA as of 2010, and (2) the ratio of
signatory cities (N=1060) to the number of a state’s cities with populations of
25,000 or more using Census data for 2005, the approximate start of the MCPA.
Because the number of signatory cities exceeds the number of cities with

populations of 25,000 or more for some states, City Ratio can exceed one. As
expected, the number of signatory cities correlates strongly (r=.807) with the
number of a state’s cities with populations of 25,000 or more.
The grouping of the independent variables derives primarily from existing
research on municipal climate activism to include social, political, and economic
factors. Social factors are civic capacity, population size, population density, and
income inequality. Civic capacity is measured by combining z-scores for
percentage of state residents with a Bachelor’s degree and average household
income (Cronbach’s alpha=.90). State population and population density are likely
to be associated with greater state economic and other resources to address climate
change. The state’s Gini Index is included in the analysis as a measure of income
inequality. To the extent that income inequality reduces state overall quality of life
(Valdamis 2015: 989), we can expect that it will also undermine public support for
climate action.
Political factors included are state partisanship and the number of environmental
organizations. As Medoff (1997) notes, state representatives’ voting record and the
average percent voting for a Presidential candidate can provide an indicator of state
partisanship. The League of Conservation Voters National Environmental
Scorecard for both the US Senate and House of Representatives afforded the first
measure aggregated for 2006 to 2010. Average percentage voting Democrat for the
2004, 2008, and 2012 US presidential elections provided a second measure of
Partisanship. The National Center for Charitable Statistics records (2014) specified
the number of environmental non-profit organizations filing form 990 in a state for
the year 2010. The number of environmental non-profit organizations, rather than
the number of these organizations per capita, arguably provides a better indicator
of a state’s social capital potential for environmental action (Brody et al. 2009). We
would expect that states with stronger environmental records, higher percentages
of Democratic voters (Wang 2012: 604), and a greater number of environmental
organizations would be more likely to have higher levels of municipal climate
activism.
The only economic factor examined is the proportion of a state’s total
employment that is involved in extraction, manufacturing, transportation, or
production industries. As Zahran et al. (2008) note, while social and civic capacity
enhance the potential for climate activism, greater investment in the carbon-based
economy represents a barrier. Additionally, coastal states experience, or will likely
experience, greater risk associated with climate change (with both rising sea levels

and the proximity to other climatological phenomena like hurricanes) increasing
the likelihood of municipal climate action. We expect that states with higher levels
of carbon employment will have lower levels of municipal climate activism, while
proximity to the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans will increase it.
Three dichotomous measures from the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions
are the basis of state energy and climate policy: (1) a State Climate Action Plan
(CAP), (2) a mandatory Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard (RPS), and (3) an
Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS). The presence or absence of these
policies are noted for 2008 or prior, approximately the middle of the MCPA
campaign. Scores are summed together to create State Leader ranging between 0
and 3 (Cronbach’s alpha=.789). While the resulting measure clearly assesses more
than just state climate policy, a more expansive measure differentiates policy
leadership.3 As Carley (2011) indicates, RPS and EERS policies adoption rates vary
across states and may be more indicative of energy policy innovations than climate
policy alone. Fourteen states have enacted all three policies, an equal number have
enacted none, and eleven each respectively have adopted one or two (see Appendix
A for more details of these variables). Adoption of these policies should be
positively associated with sub-state climate activism.4 Addressing this question
directly, Krause (2010) demonstrates that state CAP and GHG emission targets,
along with political ideology, and percent of state employment in manufacturing,
are unrelated to the MCPA signatory status of cities with populations of 25,000 or
more. Excluding cities with populations less than 25,000, however, may have
underestimated these effects. As Kwon et al. (2014) and Osofsky (2012) argue,
state CAPs or other environmental and energy policies can affect municipal climate
activism in a myriad of ways.

Table 1: Study Variables
State Characteristic
Dependent Variables
Percentage of State
Population Covered
by MCPA
City Ratio
Independent Variables1
Population Size
Civic Capacity (Z score)
Gini Index
League of Conservation
Voters Scorecard for all
Congress
Average Percentage
voting Democrat (20042012)
Population Density
(persons per square mile)
Number of
Environmental
Organizations filing
Form 990
Proportion of workers
employed in carbon
based industries
State Leadership
1

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

S.D.

1.7

55.2

24.1

13.2

.14

5.0

1.0

.93

576,626
-1.76
.40
8.5

38,041,430
2.03
.50
95.9

6,268,126
0
.45
55.5

7,000,878
.95
.02
26.4

28.3

65.7

48.2

9.3

1.2

1195

195.1

261.0

25

1375

209.75

220.1

.13

.24

.18

.03

0

3

1.5

1.2

Excludes Coastal/Non-Coastal as this is a dichotomous nominal variable.

Results
Table 2 Rank Order of States by Percentage for Covered State
Population
Rank

State

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

NY
AZ
AK
CA
NV
NM
NE
IL
OR
MA
NJ
WA
MN
RI
FL
CT
NC
IA
NH
IN
TX
WI
OH
MT
KY

Covered
Population
55.17
48.38
46.89
44.17
43.62
42.10
39.86
38.90
35.88
34.27
34.24
34.22
33.58
33.21
32.03
31.38
31.00
29.87
27.74
27.59
27.54
26.53
24.67
24.42
24.41

Rank

State

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

MI
ND
HI
ID
MO
PA
VA
CO
ME
KS
DE
MD
AR
LA
GA
SC
MS
AL
UT
VT
TN
OK
SD
WV
WY

Covered
Population
24.11
23.27
21.90
21.59
20.85
20.75
18.16
17.55
17.26
17.14
15.35
15.10
14.50
14.09
12.09
10.24
10.12
8.87
7.94
7.67
4.63
3.83
2.83
2.33
1.71

Table 2 reports the percentage of the state population covered by the MCPA
agreement. The range falls between 1.7 percent for Wyoming to 55.2 percent for
New York, the only state where the majority of the population is covered. New
York City’s participation in the MCPA clearly helped New York state rise to the
top place. As noted earlier, some 1,060 cities have signed on to the agreement,
representing 30 percent of the US population. As the table suggests, significant

percentage differences exist between states. Regional differences (not reported in
the table) are also evident with Western states having the highest average of 30.0
percent, followed by the Northeast (29.1 percent), Midwest (25.8 percent), and the
South (15.3 percent).
Table 3 Rank Order of States by City Ratio
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

State
ME
HI
NJ
VT
MD
NH
NC
AK
IA
NY
MN
PA
SD
NM
DE
CT
FL
OR
WA
MO
CO
NV
MT
WV
ID

City Rate
5.00
4.00
3.44
2.00
1.86
1.80
1.67
1.67
1.65
1.42
1.36
1.25
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.99
0.94
0.92
0.88
0.85
0.83
0.83
0.80
0.78

Rank
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

State
WI
MA
KS
KY
MI
IL
AZ
VA
SC
RI
OH
CA
NE
ND
IN
GA
AR
WY
LA
TX
TN
AL
MS
UT
OK

City Rate
0.77
0.76
0.75
0.7
0.69
0.69
0.65
0.63
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.56
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.38
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.32
0.32
0.28
0.16
0.14

Table 3 reports the ratio of signatory cities to the number of cities with a
population of 25,000 or more (City Ratio). As noted earlier, City Ratio indicates
the degree of diffusion across cities within the state and thus adjusts (in part) for
variation in the number of municipalities and state population. The City Ratio varies
between a low .14 for Oklahoma, to a high of 5.0 for Maine. As with covered state
population, City Ratio varies between regions (not reported in table) with the
highest being the Northeast (1.9) followed by the West (1.0), the Midwest (.82),
and the South (.62). The Pearson correlation of .299 (p≤.05) indicates that both
indicators are measuring similar but also unique dimensions of state climate
activism. Outlier and normality analysis of the data indicated that Covered State
Population approximates normality. For City Ratio, three outlier states (Maine,
Hawaii, and New Jersey) exceeded three standard deviations prompting deletion
from the analysis, resulting in an approximately normal but slightly positively
skewed distribution.
Table 4 Pearson Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables
Variable
Civic
Capacity
Pop.
Density
State
Pop
Gini
Index
LCV
Score
Avg.
Democrat
Envir.
Orgs
Carbon
Employ
State
Leader

Pop
Den.
.553*
*
---

State
Pop.
.112

Gini
Index
-.112

LCV
Score
.544*

Avg.
Demo.
.575*

Envir.
Orgs
.074

Carbon
Employ
-.692*

State
Leader
.513*

Coastal
Prox.
.382

.169

.371*
*
.517*

.496*

.539*

-.030

-.507*

.366*

.463*

.065

.224

.660*

-.168

.227

.269

---

.075

.173

.156

-.127

-.028

.293*

---

.881*

.271

-555*

.628*

.229

---

.212

-.621*

.725*

.373**

---

-110

.146

.113

---

-.521*

-.344*

---

.144

---

*(p≤.05)
Table 4 reports the correlation matrix for all the independent variables. Results
indicate a predictable pattern of intercorrelations between social, environmental,
and political factors. Carbon Employment correlates as expected with Civic

Capacity, population density, LCV score, and average percent Democrat with
Pearson correlations ranging between -507 to -.692. Overall, results suggest
moderate to strong positive intercorrelations between State Leader and Civic
Capacity (.513), LCV score (.628), average percent Democrat (.725), and
negatively with Carbon Employment (-.521). The correlation between LCV score
and average percent Democrat (.881) suggests the possibility of collinearity. To
overcome this problem for the following regression analysis, the z-score
transformations for both variables were averaged together as a combined measure
of political and environmental partisanship (Cronbach’s Alpha=.937). Higher
Partisanship scores represent states with higher percentage of Democratic voters
and higher LCV score.
Table 5 Stepwise Linear Regression Results Predicting Covered
State Population
Variable
B
Standard
Beta
error
(Constant)
.241
.011
Partisanship

.132

r2
Adjusted r2
F-ratio
*(p≤.05)

.657
.650
92.047*

.014

.811*

Table 5 reports the forward stepwise regression results for covered state
population. Forward stepwise regression enters predictor variables into the equation
one at a time in order of their correlation with the dependent variable. The process
stops when additional variables no longer contribute significantly to the explained
variance (Mertler and Vannatta 2005: 170). Stepwise regression is the preferred
analysis strategy given the limited number of cases (N=50) and the number of
independent variables. The results indicate that only Partisanship is significantly
associated with covered state population, accounting for 65 percent of the variance
between states. Thus, other factors do not contribute to a significant improvement
in the variance after accounting for the influence of Partisanship. The results are
surprising given the amount of variance explained, and by the general lack of
significant association for other variables.

Table 6 Stepwise Linear Regression Results Predicting City
Ratio
Variable
B
Standard
Beta
error
(Constant)
.543
.094
State Leader

.197

r2
Adjusted r2
F-ratio

.259
.243
15.728*

.050

.509*

r*(p≤.05)

Table 6 repeats the forward stepwise regression for City Ratio. City Ratio
accounts for the degree of diffusion of the MCPA among cities by examining the
ratio of the number of signatory cities (some of whom have a population less than
25,000) relative to cities with a population of 25,000 or more. This measure of
municipal climate activism provides a partial adjustment for state population. The
inclusion of state population in the regression equation is an additional control. The
results indicate that only State Leader emerges as significant, with an adjusted r2
of .243. As with Covered State Population, other study factors did not contribute
significantly to understanding variability in municipal climate activism after
accounting for the influence of State Leader. Despite the lower than expected
amount of explained variance, the results support the assertion that more proactive
state energy policy is associated with climate activism at the municipal level.
Table 7 Stepwise Linear Regression Results Predicting State
Leadership
Variable
B
Standard error Beta
(Constant)
1.500
.116
Partisanship

1.060

r2
Adjusted r2
F-ratio
*(p≤.05)

.529
.519
53.850*

.145

.727*

As noted earlier, several sociodemographic and geographic factors are
associated with energy policy leadership, including coastal location and region
(Deitchman 2017: 58), civic capacity, and political partisanship (Brody et al. 2009).
Given the strong association between State Leader and City Ratio, study factors
were regressed on State Leader. Table 7 presents these results. Only Partisanship
remained as a significant factor, accounting for approximately half of the variance
between states (adjusted r2=.519). These results indicate that partisanship is
strongly associated with state climate and energy leadership. In other words, states
with a stronger environmental voting record and a larger percentage of the
population voting Democratic also have a higher State Leadership score.
These findings confirm existent research regarding the role of state ideology
influencing adoption of specific energy and climate policies (Lyon and Yin, 2010;
Vasseur 2014; Deitchman 2017). As Geri and McNabb (2011) argue, state energy
policy is more likely now than in the recent past to reflect partisan differences.
Policy instruments measuring state policy context (CAP, RPS, and EERS) are also
strongly associated with state partisanship (Pearson correlations .603 to .673).
These findings correspond with Bromley-Tujilo et al.’s (2016) research
demonstrating higher probabilities of policy adoption, particularly CAP and RPS,
among liberal Democratic legislatures. These results provide at least limited
support for seeing municipal climate activism as situated in the larger state political
and policy milieu.
As Rabe (2011) noted earlier, state innovation in energy policy, particularly the
development of state CAPs, occurred at a time when the Democratic Party
controlled the majority of state houses. Rollbacks or efforts to weaken these policies
is occurring in some states (Hess et al 2016), raising concerns over the future of
state-led efforts to promote GHG reductions. As Antonio and Brulle (2011) argue,
while both parties have promoted neoliberal approaches to energy and
environmental policy, differences between the two parties has clearly widened with
time. On the other hand, Hess et al. (2016) demonstrate that Republican dominated
state legislatures do pass “green laws” when they are consistent with conservative
ideological frames; i.e., promote regulatory relief, smaller government, and
voluntary actions. Furthermore, state natural resources, such as renewable energy
potential, impact likelihood of adoption (Bromley-Tujilo et al. 2016), with wind
power in Texas being a notable example (Carley 2011; Fischlein et al. 2014). As
Vasseur (2010) cautions, we should resist viewing the determinants of state energy
and environmental policy adoption in binary terms. While these results underscore

the importance of partisanship both for understanding state energy policy and substate municipal climate activism, significant variation remains unexplained.
Conclusion
As Bulkeley (2010) notes, national governments around the world have provided
only limited and largely inconsistent support for climate change policy and action.
Globalization and the transboundary nature of climate change have opened a new
chapter in environmental governance and an accompanying political economy
focused on the control of carbon. At this point, however, carbon control is a largely
voluntary enterprise (Engel 2006); thus, its implications for an emerging political
economy remain unclear. For now, how cities and states interpret the climate
dilemma and implement policies related to the reduction of GHG emissions is
central to the future of climate debate.
To date, little research has examined the interconnection between US states and
municipal climate activism, each being viewed as responding to differing
exigencies when addressing the problem of global climate change (Krause
2010:47). The declining role of the national government (at least for now)
necessitates further exploration of how state-level factors impinge on efforts of
cities to mitigate and adapt to climate change. This research has confirmed the
association of certain state-level sociodemographic factors with municipal climate
activism, particularly energy policy leadership, percentage of Democratic voters,
and state environmental voting record.
This research highlights the significance of partisanship and energy policy at the
state level for understanding municipal climate activism. These results are
significant for a number of reasons. States, cities, and non-state actors are likely the
primary locus of policy implementation in the US, at least in the near term. Abbott
and Kasprzyk (2012) note that the emerging “disarticulated federalism” of climate
change policy produces both significant innovation and future uncertainty. There is
much promise, as former NYC Mayor Bloomberg (2017) recently suggested, in
realizing the Paris Agreement with policies and actions already on the ground.
Whether states, cities, and other sub-state actors can effectively reduce GHG
emissions in the absence of federal leadership remains an open question. It is clear
that more politically motivated states and cities will continue to act in ways
consistent with a retreat from the carbon era, albeit with differing motivations and
issue framing.

While cities and some states have made significant strides reducing carbon
emissions, more coordination across levels of government, including regional
planning associations (Barbour and Deakin (2012), is required. As Betsill (2001)
notes, climate change policy is inherently intergovernmental. Thus understanding
the city-state relationship is imperative but only part of the larger context of
multilevel climate governance. While state partisanship serves both to enable and
constrain local climate action, such differences may decline as states transition from
climate mitigation to adaptation (Wang 2012). Given the near abdication of federal
government and the varying context of state energy leadership, municipalities are
clearly the most significant force for climate action. As Bulkeley (2010: 231)
argues, understanding municipal climate activism “. . . requires a more nuanced
concept of the city as a site within which climate governance is taking place.” The
latter point recognizes the need to examine the unique exigencies facing
municipalities as they address climate change as well as the larger
intergovernmental milieu. Osofsky’s (2012) research on Minnesota’s GreenStep
Cities Program5 underscores the potential of enabling state energy legislation for
encouraging voluntary municipal climate action among suburban cities who vary
significantly in core needs, institutional and financial capacity, and partisanship. A
multiscaled approach (McKendy 2015), one that includes statewide and regional
networks, can overcome impediments posed by the national debate on climate
policy.

Footnotes
1.

The United States Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement began with a
series of discussions at the “Sundance Summit” in July of 2004, in Salt Lake City, and
approved at the June 2005 meeting of the mayors. In March 2007, the Climate Protection
Center (CPC) was officially launched (USCM 2007). The USCM also began recognizing
outstanding cities through its Climate Protection Awards. These annual awards recognize
the best practices of cities for their work in promoting climate protection. CPC provides
resources such as reports on best practices (USCM 2011, 2014, 2014), press releases, the
current list of participating cities, and the MCPA form. Following President Trump’s June
2017 withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in June 2017, several cities, states, universities
and colleges, and businesses signed an open letter to the President entitled ”We are Still
In” (Alverz 2017; Popvich and Schlossberg 2017)). The USCM passed a nonbinding
resolution at its annual meeting exhorting President Trump to remain in the Paris Climate
Accord, along with additional resolutions promoting renewable energy, addressing rising
sea levels, energy efficiency, and the like (USCM 2017).

2.

For additional background on the evolution of subnational city networks, see Reckien et
al. (2015), Osofsky (2012), Betsill and Bulkely (2006), and Bulkeley (2010).

3.

Assessing which states are leaders depends on how factors are weighted. Deitchman’s
(2017) typology assigns states into “leader” and “laggard” status based on seven
dichotomous energy measures, including energy efficiency standards, renewable energy
portfolio standard, and adoption of a Climate Action Plan (p. 57). In addition, innovations
in state financing of energy program is another defining feature of energy leadership.
Leader states tend to be heavily concentrated in Democratic, Western, and Northeastern
states. Fuel type is also relevant to ranking, as leaders are more likely to be states not reliant
on coal as the predominant fuel source.

4.

Few studies examine the impact of statewide energy policy on sub-state actors. Abbott and
Kasprzyk (2012) demonstrate a strong association between climate policy scores at the
state-level and climate action planning for higher educational institutions who are
signatories of the American College and Universities Presidents’ Climate Commitment
(ACUPCC).

5.

https://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/.

Appendix A. Variable and Data Sources
State Characteristic
Percentage of state population covered by
agreement
Ratio of signatory cities to cities with a
population of 25,000 or more

Source and Year
US Mayors Conference 2006-2012

Population size and density (estimate)
Civic Capacity: Percentage with Bachelor's
degree, and Average State Income
Gini Index
League of Conservation Voters scorecard for US
Congress
Percentage change in Presidential voting for
Democratic President (2004 to 2012)
Environmental Organizations (501(c)(3)
organizations from Tax Form 990)
Carbon Employment: percentage of workers
employed in extractive, manufacturing,
transportation, or production occupations
State Leader

Census Bureau 2012
ACS 2009

Census Bureau County City Data Book
https://www.census.gov/library/pub
lications/2010/compendia/databook
s/ccdb07.html

Census Bureau 2010
League of Conservation Voters 20062010
Federal Election Commission 2004,
2008, 2012
National Center for Charitable
Statistics (2014)
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010

Center for Climate and Energy
Solutions (C2ES)
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